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Abstract
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based
on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that
links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of
players’ rationality defined by means of ‘monotonic’ properties, with
the iterated elimination of strategies that do not satisfy these prop-
erties. It allows us to deduce the customary results concerned with
true common beliefs of rationality and iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies as simple corollaries. This approach relies on
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem.
We also provide an axiomatic presentation of this generic result.
This allows us to clarify the proof-theoretic principles assumed in play-
ers’ reasoning.
Finally, we provide an alternative characterization of the iterated
elimination of strategies based on the concept of a public announce-
ment. It applies to ‘global properties’. Both classes of properties
include the notions of rationalizability and the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies.
Keywords: epistemic analysis, possibility correspondences, fixpoints, mono-
tonicity, rationalizability, public announcements.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Epistemic analysis of strategic games (in short, games) aims at predicting the
choices of rational players in the presence of (partial or common) knowledge
or belief about the behaviour of other players. Most often it focusses on the
iterated elimination of never best responses (a notion termed as rationaliz-
ability), the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) and
on justification of the strategies selected in Nash and correlated equilibria.
Starting with Aumann [1987], Brandenburger and Dekel [1987] and Tan
and Werlang [1988] a large body of literature arose that investigates the epis-
temic foundations of rationalizability by modelling the reasoning employed
by players in choosing their strategies. Such an analysis, based either on
possibility correspondences and partition spaces, or Harsanyi type spaces, is
limited either to finite or compact games with continuous payoffs, or to two-
player games, see, e.g., Battigalli and Bonanno [1999] or Ely and Peski [2006].
In turn, in the case of IESDS the epistemic analysis has focussed on
finite games (with an infinite hierarchy of beliefs) and strict dominance either
by pure or by mixed strategies, see, e.g. Brandenburger, Friedenberg and
Keisler [2008].
1.2 Contributions
In this paper we provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games
based on possibility correspondences. We prove a generic result that is con-
cerned with monotonic program properties1 used by the players to select
optimal strategies.
More specifically, given a belief model for the initial strategic game, de-
note by RAT(φ) the property that each player i uses a property φi to select
his strategy (‘each player i is φi-rational’). We establish in Section 4 the
following main result:
Assume that each property φi is monotonic. The set of joints
strategies that the players choose in the states in which RAT(φ)
is a true common belief is included in the set of joint strategies
1The concepts of monotonic, global and local properties are introduced in Section 3.
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that remain after the iterated elimination of the strategies that
for player i are not φi-optimal.
In general, transfinite iterations of the strategy elimination are possible.
For some belief models the inclusion can be reversed.
This generic result covers the usual notion of rationalizability in finite
games and a global version of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. For the customary, local version of the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies we justify in Section 5 the statement
true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality im-
plies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
for arbitrary games and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. Ra-
tionality refers here to the concept studied in Bernheim [1984].
Strict dominance is a non-monotonic property, so the use of monotonic
properties allowed us to provide epistemic foundations for non-monotonic
properties. However, weak dominance, another non-monotonic property, re-
mains beyond the reach of this approach. A mathematical reason is that its
global version is also non-monotonic (see Apt [2007c]), in contrast to strict
dominance, the global version of which is monotonic. To provide epistemic
foundations of weak dominance the only currently known approach is that
of Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2008] based on the lexicographic
probability systems.
We also provide, in Section 6, an axiomatic presentation of the above
generic result. This clarifies the logical underpinnings of the epistemic anal-
ysis and shows that the use of transfinite iterations can be naturally captured
by a single inference rule that involves greatest fixpoints. Also, it shows that
the relevant monotonic properties can be defined using positive formulae.
Finally, inspired by van Benthem [2007], we provide in Section 7 an alter-
native characterization of the strategies that remain after iterated elimination
of strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal, based on the concept of a
public announcement due to Plaza [1989]. Here monotonicity is not needed
and we obtain a generalization of van Benthem’s results to arbitrary strategic
games and to other properties than rationalizability, notably a global version
of weak dominance.
Apart of the necessity of the use of transfinite iterations when studying
arbitrary strategic games, our analysis shows the relevance of two concepts
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of the underlying properties φi used by the players to select their strategies.
The first one is monotonicity which allows us to use Tarski’s Fixpoint The-
orem. The second is globality, which intuitively means that each subgame
obtained by iterated elimination of strategies is analyzed in the context of the
given initial game. While the proposed epistemic analysis of arbitrary games
based on possibility correspondences crucially depends on the use of mono-
tonic properties, the one based on public announcement applies to global
properties.
1.3 Connections
The relevance of monotonicity in the context of epistemic analysis of finite
strategic games has already been pointed out in van Benthem [2007]. The
distinction between local and global properties is from Apt [2007b] and Apt
[2007c].
To show that for some belief models an equality holds between the sets of
joint strategies chosen in the states in which RAT(φ) a true common belief
and the set of joint strategies that remain after the iterated elimination of
the strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal requires use of transfinite
ordinals. This complements the findings of Lipman [1991] in which transfinite
ordinals are used in a study of limited rationality, and Lipman [1994], where a
two-player game is constructed for which the ω0 (the first infinite ordinal) and
ω0 + 1 iterations of the rationalizability operator of Bernheim [1984] differ.
In turn, Heifetz and Samet [1998] show that in general arbitrary ordinals
are necessary in the epistemic analysis of strategic games based on partition
spaces. Further, as argued in Chen, Long and Luo [2005], the notion of
IESDS a` la Milgrom and Roberts [1990], when used for arbitrary games, also
requires transfinite iterations of the underlying operator.
Some of the results presented here were initially reported in a different
presentation, in Apt [2007a].
2 Preliminaries
This paper connects three concepts, operators on a complete lattice, strategic
games and possibility correspondences. In this section we introduce these
concepts and recall basic results concerning them.
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2.1 Operators
Consider a fixed complete lattice (D, ⊆ ) with the largest element ⊤. In
what follows we use ordinals and denote them by α, β, γ. Given a, possibly
transfinite, sequence (Gα)α<γ of elements of D we denote their join and meet
respectively by
⋃
α<γ Gα and
⋂
α<γ Gα.
Definition 1. Let T be an operator on (D, ⊆ ), i.e., T : D→D.
• We call T monotonic if for all G,G′
G⊆G′ implies T (G)⊆ T (G′).
• We call T contracting if for all G
T (G)⊆G.
• We say that an element G is a fixpoint of T if G = T (G) and a
post-fixpoint of T if G⊆ T (G).
• We define by transfinite induction a sequence of elements T α of D,
where α is an ordinal, as follows:
– T 0 := ⊤,
– T α+1 := T (T α),
– for all limit ordinals β, T β :=
⋂
α<β T
α.
• We call the least α such that T α+1 = T α the closure ordinal of T
and denote it by αT . We call then T
αT the outcome of (iterating) T
and write it alternatively as T∞. ✷
So an outcome is a fixpoint reached by a transfinite iteration that starts
with the largest element. In general, the outcome of an operator does not
need to exist but we have the following classic result due to Tarski [1955].2
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem Every monotonic operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has
an outcome, i.e., T∞ is well-defined. Moreover,
T∞ = νT = ∪{G | G⊆ T (G)},
2We use here its ‘dual’ version in which the iterations start at the largest and not at
the least element of a complete lattice.
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where νT is the largest fixpoint of T .
In contrast, a contracting operator does not need to have a largest fix-
point. But we have the following obvious observation.
Note 1. Every contracting operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has an outcome, i.e., T∞
is well-defined. ✷
In Section 5 we shall need the following lemma, that modifies the corre-
sponding lemma from Apt [2007c] from finite to arbitrary complete lattices.
Lemma 1. Consider two operators T1 and T2 on (D, ⊆ ) such that
• for all G, T1(G)⊆ T2(G),
• T1 is monotonic,
• T2 is contracting.
Then T∞1 ⊆ T
∞
2 .
Proof. We first prove by transfinite induction that for all α
T α1 ⊆ T
α
2 . (1)
By the definition of the iterations we only need to consider the induction
step for a successor ordinal. So suppose the claim holds for some α. Then by
the first two assumptions and the induction hypothesis we have the following
string of inclusions and equalities:
T α+11 = T1(T
α
1 )⊆ T1(T
α
2 )⊆ T2(T
α
2 ) = T
α+1
2 .
This shows that for all α (1) holds. By Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem and
Note 1 the outcomes of T1 and T2 exist, which implies the claim. ✷
2.2 Strategic games
Given n players (n > 1) by a strategic game (in short, a game) we mean
a sequence (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn), where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
• Si is the non-empty set of strategies (sometimes called actions) avail-
able to player i,
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• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so pi : S1 × . . .× Sn→R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly with some superscripts.
Given s ∈ S1× . . .×Sn we denote the ith element of s by si, write sometimes
s as (si, s−i), and use the following standard notation:
• s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
• S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn.
Given a finite non-empty set A we denote by ∆A the set of probability
distributions over A and call any element of ∆Si amixed strategy of player
i.
In the remainder of the paper we assume an initial strategic game
H := (H1, . . ., Hn, p1, . . ., pn).
A restriction of H is a sequence (G1, . . ., Gn) such that Gi ⊆Hi for all
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We identify the restriction (H1, . . ., Hn) with H . We shall
focus on the complete lattice that consists of the set of all restrictions of the
game H ordered by the componentwise set inclusion:
(G1, . . ., Gn)⊆ (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n) iff Gi ⊆G
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
So H is the largest element in this lattice and
⋃
α<γ and
⋂
α<γ are the cus-
tomary set-theoretic operations on the restrictions.
Consider now a restriction G := (G1, . . ., Gn) ofH and two strategies si, s
′
i
from Hi (so not necessarily from Gi). We say that si is strictly dominated
on G by s′i (and write s
′
i ≻G si) if
∀s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i),
and that si is weakly dominated on G by s
′
i (and write s
′
i ≻
w
G si) if
∀s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) ∧ ∃s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
In the case of finite games, once the payoff function is extended in the
expected way to mixed strategies, the relations ≻G and ≻
w
G between a mixed
strategy and a pure strategy are defined in the same way.
A belief of player i held in G := (G1, . . ., Gn) can be
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• a joint strategy of the opponents of player i in G (i.e., s−i ∈ G−i),
• or, in the case the game is finite, a joint mixed strategy of the opponents
of player i (i.e., (m1, . . ., mi−1, mi+1, . . ., mn), where mj ∈ ∆Gj for all
j),
• or, in the case the game is finite, a correlated strategy of the oppo-
nents of player i (i.e., m ∈ ∆G−i).
Each payoff function pi can be modified to an expected payoff function
pi : Gi × Bi→R, where Bi is one of the above three sets of beliefs of player
i.
Further, given a restriction G′ := (G′1, . . ., G
′
n) of H , we say that the
strategy si from Hi is a best response in G
′ to some belief µi held in
G if
∀s′i ∈ G
′
i pi(si, µi) ≥ pi(s
′
i, µi).
2.3 Possibility correspondences
In this and the next subsection we essentially follow the exposition of Bat-
tigalli and Bonanno [1999]. Fix a non-empty set Ω of states . By an event
we mean a subset of Ω.
A possibility correspondence is a mapping from Ω to the powerset
P(Ω) of Ω. We consider three properties of a possibility correspondence P :
(i) for all ω, P (ω) 6= ∅,
(ii) for all ω and ω′, ω′ ∈ P (ω) implies P (ω′) = P (ω),
(iii) for all ω, ω ∈ P (ω).
If the possibility correspondence satisfies properties (i) and (ii), we call
it a belief correspondence and if it satisfies properties (i)–(iii), we call it
a knowledge correspondence.3 Note that each belief correspondence P
yields a partition {P (ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of Ω.
3Note that the notion of a belief has two meanings in the literature on epistemic analysis
of strategic games, so also in this paper. From the context it is always clear which notion
is used. In the modal logic terminology a belief correspondence is a frame for the modal
logic KD45 and a knowledge correspondence is a frame for the modal logic S5, see, e.g.
Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema [2001].
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Assume now that each player i has at its disposal a possibility correspon-
dence Pi. Fix an event E. We define
E := 1E := {ω ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., n} Pi(ω)⊆ E},
by induction on k ≥ 1

k+1E := kE,
and finally

∗E :=
∞⋂
k=1

kE.
If all Pis are belief correspondences, we usually write B instead of  and
if all Pis are knowledge correspondences, we usually write K instead of .
When ω ∈ B∗E, we say that the event E is common belief in the state
ω and when ω ∈ K∗E, we say that the event E is common knowledge in
the state ω.
By property (iii) of the possibility correspondences we have KE ⊆ E and
K∗E ⊆E.
An event F is called evident if F ⊆F . That is, F is evident if for
all ω ∈ F we have Pi(ω)⊆ F for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. In what follows we shall
use the following alternative characterizations of common belief and common
knowledge based on the evident events:
ω ∈ ∗E iff for some evident event F we have ω ∈ F ⊆E, (2)
where  = B or  = K (see Monderer and Samet [1989], respectively
Proposition 4 on page 180 and Proposition on page 175),
ω ∈ K∗E iff for some evident event F we have ω ∈ F ⊆ E, (3)
(see Aumann [1976, page 1237]).
Finally, in Section 6 we shall use the following alternative characterization
of common beliefs and common knowledge.
Note 2. For all belief correspondences

∗E :=
⋃
{F ⊆ Ω | F ⊆ (E ∩ F ).
Proof. We have the following string of equivalences:
F is evident and F ⊆E iff F ⊆F and F ⊆E
iff F ⊆F ∩E
iff F ⊆(F ∩ E),
so the claim follows by (2). ✷
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2.4 Models for games
We now link these considerations with the strategic games. Given a restric-
tion G := (G1, . . ., Gn) of the initial game H , by a model for G we mean
a set of states Ω together with a sequence of functions si : Ω→Gi, where
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We denote it by (Ω, s1, . . ., sn).
In what follows, given a function f and a subset E of its domain, we
denote by f(E) the range of f on E and by f |E the restriction of f to E.
By the standard model M for G we mean the model in which
• Ω := G1 × . . .×Gn (which means that for ω ∈ Ω, ωi is well-defined),
• si(ω) := ωi.
So the states of the standard model for G are exactly the joint strategies in
G, and each si is a projection function. Since the initial game H is given,
we know the payoff functions p1, . . ., pn. So in the context of H a standard
model is just an alternative way of representing a restriction of H .
Given a (not necessarily standard) model M := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) for a re-
striction G and a vector of events E = (E1, . . ., En) in M we define
GE := (s1(E1), . . ., sn(En))
and call it the restriction of G to E. When each Ei equals E we write
GE instead of GE .
Finally, we extend the notion of a model for a restriction G to a belief
model for G by assuming that each player i has a belief correspondence Pi on
Ω. If each Pi is a knowledge correspondence, we refer then to a knowledge
model .
3 Local and global properties
The assumption that each player is rational is one of the basic stipulations
within the framework of strategic games. However, rationality can be differ-
ently interpreted by different players.4 This may for example mean that a
player
4This matter is obfuscated by the fact that the etymologically related noun ‘rational-
izability’ stands by now for the concept introduced in Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984]
that refers to the outcome of iterated elimination of never best responses.
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• does not choose a strategy weakly/strictly dominated by another pure/mixed
strategy,
• chooses only best replies to the (beliefs about the) strategies of the
opponents.
In this paper we are interested in analyzing situations in which each player
pursues his own notion of rationality, more specifically those situations in
which this information is common knowledge or common belief. As a special
case we cover then the usually analyzed situation in which all players use the
same notion of rationality.
Given player i in the initial strategic game H := (H1, . . ., Hn, p1, . . ., pn)
we formalize his notion of rationality using a property φi(si, G) that holds be-
tween a strategy si ∈ Hi and a restriction G of H . Intuitively, φi(si, G) holds
if si is an ‘optimal’ strategy for player i within the restriction G, assuming
that he uses the property φi to select optimal strategies.
We distinguish though between what we call ‘local’ and ‘global’ optimal-
ity. To assess optimality of a strategy si locally within the restriction G, it
is sufficient for i to compare si with only those strategies s
′
i that occur in
Gi. On the other hand, to assess the optimality of si globally, player i must
consider all of his strategies s′i that occur in his strategy set Hi in the initial
game H .
Global properties are then those in which a player’s strategy is evaluated
with respect to all his strategies in the initial game, whereas local properties
are concerned solely with a comparison of strategies available in the restric-
tion G. We will write φl when we refer to a local property, and φg when we
refer to a global property.
Here are some examples which show that the notions of rationality men-
tioned above can be formalized in a number of natural ways. We also give one
example in both its local and global form in order to illustrate the distinction
between them:
• sdli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is not strictly domi-
nated on G by any strategy from Gi (i.e., ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻G si),
• sdgi (si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is not strictly domi-
nated on G by any strategy from Hi (i.e., ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Hi s
′
i ≻G si),
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• (assuming H is finite)msdli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player
i is not strictly dominated on G by any of its mixed strategy from G,
(i.e., ¬∃m′i ∈ ∆Gi m
′
i ≻G si),
• wdli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is not weakly domi-
nated on G by any strategy from Gi (i.e., ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻
w
G si),
• (assuming H is finite)mwdli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player
i is not weakly dominated on G by any mixed strategies over Gi (i.e.,
¬∃m′i ∈ ∆G
′
i m
′
i ≻
w
G si),
• brli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is a best response
among Gi to some belief µi held in G (i.e., for some belief µi held in
G, ∀s′i ∈ Gi pi(si, µi) ≥ pi(s
′
i, µi)).
We say that the property φi(·, ·) used by player i is monotonic if for all
restrictions G and G′ of H and si ∈ Hi
G⊆G′ and φ(si, G) implies φ(si, G
′).
Each sequence of properties φ := (φ1, . . ., φn) determines an operator Tφ
on the restrictions of H defined by
Tφ(G) := (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n),
where G := (G1, . . ., Gn) and for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
G′i := {si ∈ Gi | φi(si, G)}.
Since Tφ is contracting, by Note 1 it has an outcome, i.e., T
∞
φ
is well-
defined. Moreover, if each φi is monotonic, then Tφ is monotonic and by
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem its largest fixpoint νTφ exists and equals T
∞
φ
.
Intuitively, Tφ(G) is the result of removing from G all strategies that are
not φi-optimal. So the outcome of Tφ is the result of the iterated elimination
of strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
When each property φi equals sd
l, we write T
sd
l instead of T
sd
l and
similarly with other specific properties. The natural examples of such an
iterated elimination of strategies that were discussed in the literature are:5
5The reader puzzled by the existence of multiple definitions for the apparently uniquely
defined concepts is encouraged to consult Apt [2007b].
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• iterated elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by another
strategy;
This corresponds to the iterations of the T
sd
l operator in the case of
Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002]) and of the Tsd g operator in the case
of Chen, Long and Luo [2005].
• iterated elimination of strategies that are weakly dominated by another
strategy;
• (for finite games) iterated elimination of strategies that are weakly,
respectively strictly, dominated by a mixed strategy;
These are the customary situations studied starting with Luce and
Raiffa [1957] that correspond to the iterations of the T
msd
l, respectively
T
mwd
l, operator.
• iterated elimination of strategies that are never best responses to some
belief;
This corresponds to the iterations of the Tbr g operator in the case of
Bernheim [1984] and the T
br
l operator in the case of Pearce [1984], in
each case for an appropriate set of beliefs.
Usually only the first ωo iterations of the corresponding operator T are
considered, i.e., one studies T ω0, that is
⋂
i<ω0
T i, and not T∞.
In the next section we assume that each player i employs some property φi
to select his strategies, and we analyze the situation in which this information
is tru common belief or common knowledge. To determine which strategies
are then selected by the players we shall use the Tφ operator. We shall also
explain why in general transfinite iterations are necessary.
4 Two theorems
Fix a belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn) for the initial game H . Given a
property φi(·, G) that player i uses to select his strategies in the restriction G
of H , we say that player i is φi-rational in the state ω if φi(si(ω), GPi(ω))
holds. Note that when player i believes (respectively, knows) that the state is
in Pi(ω), the restriction GPi(ω) represents his belief (respectively, his knowl-
edge) about the players’ strategies. That is, GPi(ω) is the game he believes
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(respectively, knows) to be relevant to his choice. Hence φi(si(ω), GPi(ω))
captures the idea that if player i uses φi(·, ·) to select his optimal strategy in
the game he considers relevant, then in the state ω he indeed acts ‘rationally’.
We are interested in the strategies selected by each player in the states
in which it is true and is common belief (or is common knowledge) that each
player i is φi-rational. To this end we introduce the following event:
RAT(φ) := {ω ∈ Ω | each player i is φi-rational in ω},
and consider the following two events constructed out of it: K∗RAT(φ)
and RAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ). We then focus on the corresponding restrictions
GK∗RAT(φ) and GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ).
So a strategy si is an element of the ith component of GK∗RAT(φ) if
si = si(ω) for some ω ∈ K
∗RAT(φ). That is, si is a strategy that player
i chooses in a state in which it is common knowledge that each player j is
φj-rational, and similarly for GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ).
The following result then relates for arbitrary strategic games the restric-
tions G
RAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ) and GK∗RAT(φ) to the outcome of the iteration of the
operator Tφ.
Theorem 1.
(i) Suppose that each property φi is monotonic. Then for all belief models
for H
GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
.
(ii) Suppose that each property φi is monotonic. Then for all knowledge
models for H
GK∗RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
.
(iii) For some standard belief model for H
GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ) = T
∞
φ
.
Proof.
(i) Fix a belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn) for H . Take a strategy si
that is an element of the ith component of G
RAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ). Thus we have
si = si(ω) for some state ω such that ω ∈ RAT(φ) and ω ∈ B
∗RAT(φ).
The latter implies by (2) that for some evident event F
ω ∈ F ⊆ {ω′ ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., n} Pi(ω
′)⊆RAT(φ)}. (4)
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Take now an arbitrary ω′ ∈ F ∩ RAT(φ) and i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Since
ω′ ∈ RAT(φ), player i is φi-rational in ω
′, i.e., φi(si(ω
′), GPi(ω′)) holds.
But F is evident, so Pi(ω
′)⊆ F . Moreover by (4) Pi(ω
′)⊆RAT(φ), so
Pi(ω
′)⊆ F ∩ RAT(φ). Hence GPi(ω′) ⊆GF∩RAT(φ) and by the monotonic-
ity of φi we conclude that φi(si(ω
′), GF∩RAT(φ)) holds.
By the definition of Tφ this means that GF∩RAT(φ) ⊆ Tφ(GRAT(φ)), i.e.
that GF∩RAT(φ) is a post-fixpoint of Tφ. Hence by Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem
GF∩RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
. But si = si(ω) and ω ∈ F ∩RAT(φ), so we conclude by
the above inclusion that si is an element of the ith component of T
∞
φ
. This
proves the claim.
(ii) By the definition of common knowledge for all events E we haveK∗E ⊆E.
Hence for all φ we have K∗RAT(φ)⊆RAT(φ) ∩ K∗RAT(φ) and conse-
quently GK∗RAT(φ) ⊆GRAT(φ)∩K∗RAT(φ).
(iii) We actually construct a standard belief model for H that is also a
knowledge model. Suppose T∞
φ
= (G1, . . ., Gn). Consider the event F :=
G1 × . . . × Gn in the standard model for H . Then GF = T
∞
φ
. Define each
possibility correspondence Pi by
Pi(ω) :=
{
F if ω ∈ F
Ω \ F otherwise
Each Pi is a knowledge correspondence (also when F = ∅ or F = Ω) and
clearly F is an evident event.
Take now an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and an arbitrary state ω ∈ F . Since
T∞
φ
is a fixpoint of Tφ and si(ω) ∈ Gi we have φi(si(ω), T
∞
φ
), so by the
definition of Pi we have φi(si(ω), GPi(ω)). This shows that each player i is
φi-rational in each state ω ∈ F , i.e., F ⊆RAT(φ).
Since F is evident, we conclude by (3) that in each state ω ∈ F it is
common knowledge that each player i is φi-rational, i.e., F ⊆K
∗RAT(φ).
Moreover, by the definition of common knowledge K∗RAT(φ)⊆RAT(φ).
Consequently
T∞
φ
= GF ⊆GRAT(φ)∩K∗RAT(φ),
which yields the claim by (i). ✷
Items (i) and (ii) show that when each property φi is monotonic, for all
belief models of H it holds that the strategy profiles that the players choose
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in the states in which each player i is φi-rational and it is common belief that
each player i is φi-rational (or in which it is common knowledge that each
player i is φi-rational) are included in those that remain after the iterated
elimination of the strategies that are not φi-optimal.
Note that monotonicity of the φi properties was not needed to establish
item (iii). In Chen, Long and Luo [2005], Lipman [1994] and Apt [2007b]
examples are provided showing that for the properties of strict dominance
(namely sd g) and best response (namely br g) in general transfinite iterations
(i.e., iterations beyond ω0) of the corresponding operator are necessary to
reach the outcome. So to achieve the equality for them in (iii) transfinite
iterations of the Tφ operator are necessary.
By instantiating φis to specific properties we get instances of the above
result that refer to specific definitions of rationality. This will allow us to
relate the above result to the ones established in the literature. Before we do
this we establish another result that will apply to another class of properties
φi.
Theorem 2. Suppose that
φi(si, ({s1}, . . ., {sn})) holds for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and all s ∈ H. (5)
Then for some standard knowledge model for H
GK∗RAT(φ) = H.
Proof. We extend the standard model for H by the knowledge correspon-
dences P1, . . ., Pn where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, Pi(ω) = {ω}. Then for all ω
and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
GPi(ω) = ({s1(ω)}, . . ., {sn(ω)}),
so by (5) each player i is φi-rational in ω, i.e., Ω⊆KRAT(φ). So, by
the definition of common knowledge, Ω⊆K∗RAT(φ). Consequently H =
GΩ ⊆GK∗RAT(φ) ⊆H . ✷
Note that any property φi that satisfies (5) and is not trivial (that is, for
some strategy si, φi(si, H) does not hold) is not monotonic.
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5 . . . and their consequences
Let us analyze now the consequences of the above two theorems. Consider
first Theorem 1. The following lemma, in which we refer to the properties
introduced in Section 3, clarifies the matters.
Lemma 2. The properties sd gi , msd
g
i and br
g
i are monotonic.
Proof. Straightforward. ✷
So Theorem 1 applies to the above three properties. (Note that br gi
actually comes in three ‘flavours’ depending on the choice of beliefs.) Strict
dominance in the sense of sd gi is studied in Chen, Long and Luo [2005], while
br
g
i corresponds to the rationalizability notion of Bernheim [1984].
In contrast, Theorem 1 does not apply to the properties wd gi and mwd
g
i ,
since, as indicated in Apt [2007c], the corresponding operators Twd g and
Tmwd g are not monotonic, and hence the properties wd
g
i and mwd
g
i are not
monotonic.
To see the consequences of Theorem 2 note that the properties sd li , msd
l
i ,
wd li , mwd
l
i and br
l
i satisfy (5). In particular, this theorem shows that the
‘customary’ concepts of strict dominance, sd li andmsd
l
i cannot be justified in
the used epistemic framework as ‘stand alone’ concepts of rationality. Indeed,
this theorem shows that in some knowledge models common knowledge that
each player is rational in one of these two senses does not exclude any strategy.
What can be done is to justify these two concepts as consequences of the
common knowledge of rationality defined in terms of br gi , the ‘global’ version
of the best response property, Namely, we have the following result. When
each property φi equals br
g
i , we write here RAT(br
g) instead of RAT(br g).
Theorem 3.
(i) For all belief models
GRAT(br g)∩B∗RAT(br g) ⊆ T
∞
sd
l ,
(ii) for all knowledge models
GK∗RAT(br g) ⊆ T
∞
sd
l,
where in both situations we take as the set of beliefs the set of joint strategies
of the opponents.
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Proof.
(i) By Lemma 2 and Theorem 1(i) GRAT(br g)∩B∗RAT(br g) ⊆ T
∞
br
g . Each best
response to a joint strategy of the opponents is not strictly dominated, so for
all restrictions G
Tbr g(G)⊆ Tsd g(G).
Also, for all restrictions G
Tsd g(G)⊆ Tsd l(G).
So by Lemma 1 T∞
br
g ⊆ T∞
sd
l , which concludes the proof.
(ii) By (i) and the fact that K∗RAT(br g)⊆RAT(br g). ✷
Item (ii) formalizes and justifies in the epistemic framework used here
the often used statement:
common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will
choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies
for games with arbitrary strategy sets and transfinite iterations of the elimi-
nation process, and when for the set of beliefs of a player we take the set of
joint strategies of his opponents.
In the case of finite games we have the following well-known result implic-
itly stated in Brandenburger and Dekel [1987] and explicitly formulated in
Stalnaker [1994] (see Battigalli and Bonanno [1999, page 181]). For a proof
using Harsanyi type spaces see Brandenburger and Friedenberg [2006].
Theorem 4. Assume the initial game H is finite.
(i) For all belief models for H
GRAT(br g)∩B∗RAT(br g) ⊆ T
∞
msd
l ,
(ii) for all knowledge models for H
GK∗RAT(br g) ⊆ T
∞
msd
l,
where in both situations we take as the set of beliefs the set of joint mixed
strategies of the opponents.
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Proof. The argument is analogous as in the previous proof but relies on a
subsidiary result and runs as follows.
(i) Again by Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 GRAT(br g)∩B∗RAT(br g) ⊆ T
∞
br
g . Further,
for all restrictions G
Tbr g(G)⊆ Tbr l(G)
and
T
br
l(G)⊆ T
brc
l(G),
where brc li stands for the best response property w.r.t. the correlated strate-
gies of the opponents. So by Lemma 1 T∞
br
g ⊆ T∞
brc
l.
But by the result of Osborne and Rubinstein [1994, page 60] (that is a
modification of the original result of Pearce [1984]) for all restrictions G we
have T
brc
l(G) = T
msd
l(G), so T∞
brc
l = T
∞
msd
l, which yields the conclusion.
(ii) By (i) and the fact that K∗RAT(br g)⊆RAT(br g). ✷
6 Axiomatic presentation
It is natural to ask what proof-theoretic principles about the players’ reason-
ing we are assuming in the proof of Theorem 1(i). To answer this question
we present in this section a formal language Lν that will be interpreted over
belief models. We will then give syntactic proof rules for Lν that lead to
an axiomatic proof of Theorem 1(i). Throughout the section we assume,
as usual, the initial game H and monotonic properties φ1, . . ., φn. Later we
shall introduce a language that allows us to define and analyze the relevant
properties.
To start with, we consider the simpler language L the formulae of which
are defined by the following recursive definition, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}:
ψ ::= rati | ψ ∧ ψ | ¬ψ | iψ | Oiψ,
where each rati is a constant. We abbreviate the formula
∧
i∈{1,. . .,n} rati to
rat,
∧
i∈{1,. . .,n}iψ to ψ and
∧
i∈{1,. . .,n}Oiψ to Oψ.
Formulae of L will be interpreted as events in belief models for H . Given
a belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn) for H , we define the interpretation
function I(·) : L → P(Ω) as follows:
• I(rati) = {ω ∈ Ω | φi(si(ω), GPi(ω))},
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• I(φ ∧ ψ) = I(φ) ∩ I(ψ),
• I(¬ψ) = Ω− I(ψ),
• I(iψ) = {ω ∈ Ω | Pi(ω) ⊆ I(ψ)},
• I(Oiψ) = {ω ∈ Ω | φi(si(ω), GI(ψ))}.
Note that I(rat) is the event RAT(φ) that every player is rational, I(ψ)
is the event I(ψ) that every player believes the event I(ψ) and I(Oψ) is the
event that every player’s strategy is optimal in the context of the restriction
GI(ψ).
L is a modal language in the sense of Blackburn, de Rijke and Ven-
ema [2001]. Although L can express some connections between our formal
definitions of optimality, rationality and beliefs, it is not a very expressive
language. If our interest were to reason about particular games, we could
extend the language with atoms si expressing the event that the strategy
si is chosen. This choice is often made when defining modal languages for
models of games, see, e.g., de Bruin [2004]. However, we are interested in
a finite language that would allow us to reason about games with arbitrary
strategy sets, and in particular in a language that can express the inclusion
of Theorem 1(i).
Specifically, we want a language that can express the following statement:
Imp If it is true common belief that every player is rational, then all players
choose strategies that survive the iterated elimination of non-optimal
strategies.
To this end we extend the vocabulary of L with a single set variable
denoted by x and the largest fixpoint operator νx. (The corresponding ex-
tension of the first-order logic by the dual, least fixpoint operator µx was
first studied in Gurevich [1984].) Modulo one caveat the resulting language
Lν is defined as follows, where ‘. . .’ stands for the already given definition of
L:
ψ ::= . . . | x | νx.φ.
The caveat is the following: φ must be
• positive in x, which means that each occurrence of x in φ is under
the scope of an even number of negation signs (¬),
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• ν-free, which means that it does not contain any occurrences of the
νx operator.
(The latter restriction is not necessary, but simplifies matters and is sufficient
for our considerations.)
To define the interpretation function I(·) for Lν we must keep track of
the variable x. Therefore we first extend the function I(·) on L to a function
I(·) : Lν × P(Ω) → P(Ω) by padding it with a dummy argument. We give
one clause as an example:
• I(iψ,E) = {ω ∈ Ω | Pi(ω) ⊆ I(ψ,E)}.
Then we put
• I(x, E) = E,
and finally define
• I(νx.ψ) =
⋃
{E ⊆ Ω | E ⊆ I(ψ,E)}.
It is straightforward to see that the restriction to positive in x and ν-free
formulae ψ ensures that I(ψ, ·) is a monotonic operator on the powerset P(Ω)
of Ω. Hence by Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem I(νx.ψ) is its largest fixpoint.
This language can express Imp. To see this, first notice that common be-
lief is definable in Lν using the νx operator. The analogous characterization
of common knowledge is given in Fagin et al. [1995, Section 11.5].
Note 3. Let ψ be a formula of L and x a variable. Then I(νx.(x ∧ ψ)) is
the event that the event I(ψ) is common belief.
Proof. ψ is a formula of L, so x does not occur in ψ. Note that for all F ⊆ Ω
we have
• I((x ∧ ψ), F ) = I(x, F ) ∩ I(ψ, F ),
• I(x, F ) = I(x, F ) = F ,
• I(ψ, F ) = I(ψ, F ) = I(ψ),
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where the ‘outer’  is defined in Subsection 2.3. Hence I((x ∧ ψ), F ) =
squareF ∩I(ψ), and consequently
I(νx.(x ∧ ψ)) =
⋃
{F ⊆ Ω | F ⊆ I((x ∧ ψ), F )}
=
⋃
{F ⊆ Ω | F ⊆ (F ∩ I(ψ))}
= ∗I(ψ),
where ∗ is defined in Subsection 2.3 and the last equality holds by Note 2.
✷
From now on we abbreviate the (well-formed) formula νx.(x∧ψ) for ψ
being a formula of L to ∗ψ. So ∗ is a new modality added to the language
Lν .
We can also define the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
Note 4. In the game determined by the event I(νx.Ox), every player selects
a strategy which survives the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
Proof. We must show the following inclusion:
GI(νx.Ox) ⊆ T
∞
φ
.
Let G′ := (G′1, . . . , G
′
n) = GI(νx.Ox). By Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem it
suffices to show that G′ ⊆ Tφ(G
′). So take any j ∈ {1, . . ., n} and any
s′j ∈ G
′
j . We must show that φj(s
′
j , G
′) holds. By definition for some ω ∈
I(νx.Ox) we have sj(ω) = s
′
j. Then there is some E such that ω ∈ E and
E ⊆ I(Ox,E). Therefore for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, φi(si(ω), GE) holds, so in
particular φj(s
′
j, GE) holds.
But E ⊆ I(Ox,E) implies E ⊆ I(νx.Ox) and thereforeGE ⊆ GI(νx.Ox) =
G′. Hence by monotonicity of φj we get φj(s
′
j, G
′) as desired. ✷
Now consider the following formula:
(rat ∧∗rat)→ νx.Ox. (6)
By Notes 3 and 4, we can see that wherever the formula (6) holds, then if
it is true common belief that every player is rational, then each player selects
a strategy that survives the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.
We call an Lν-formula ψ valid if for every belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn)
for H we have I(ψ) = Ω.
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We are now in a position to connect Lν to Imp: the statement Imp
asserts that the formula (6) is valid.
In the rest of this section we will discuss a simple proof system in which
we can derive (6). This will provide an alternative way of proving the corre-
sponding inclusion in Theorem 1(i).
We will use an axiom and rule of inference for the fixpoint operator taken
from Kozen [1983] and one axiom for rationality analogous to the one called
in de Bruin [2004] an ‘implicit definition’ of rationality. We give these in
Figure 1 denoting by ψ[x 7→ χ] the formula obtained from ψ by substituting
each occurence of the variable x with the formula χ.
Axiom schemata
rat→ (ψ→Oψ) ratDis
νx.ψ→ ψ[x 7→ νx.ψ] νDis
Rule of inference
χ→ ψ[x 7→ χ]
χ→ νx.ψ
νInd
Figure 1: Proof system P
First we establish the soundness of this proof system, that is that its
axioms are valid and the proof rules preserve validity.
Lemma 3. The proof system P is sound.
Proof.We show first the validity of the axiom ratDis. Let (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, Pi, . . ., Pn)
be a belief model forH . We must show that I(rat→ (ψ→ Oψ)) = Ω. That
is, that for any ψ the inclusion I(rat)∩I(ψ) ⊆ I(Oψ) holds. So take some
ω ∈ I(rat) ∩ I(ψ). Then for every i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, φi(si(ω), GPi(ω)), and
Pi(ω) ⊆ I(ψ). So by monotonicity of φi, φi(si(ω), GI(ψ)), i.e. ω ∈ I(Oiψ) as
required.
The axioms νDis and the rule νInd were introduced in Kozen [1983],
and their soundness proof is standard. This axiom and the rule formalize,
respectively, the following two consequences of Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem
concerning a monotonic operator T :
• νT is a post-fixpoint of T , i.e., νT ⊆ T (νT ) holds,
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• if Y is a post-fixpoint of T , i.e., Y ⊆ T (Y ) holds, then Y ⊆ νT . ✷
Next, we establish the already announced claim.
Theorem 5. The formula (6) is a theorem of the proof system P.
Proof. The following formula is an instance of the axiom ratDis (with ψ :=

∗rat ∧ rat):
rat→ ((∗rat ∧ rat)→ O(∗rat ∧ rat)),
and the following is an instance of νDis (with ψ := (x ∧ rat)):

∗rat→(∗rat ∧ rat)
Putting these two together via some simple propositional logic, we obtain:
(∗rat ∧ rat)→O(∗rat ∧ rat).
This last formula is of the right shape to apply the rule νInd (with χ :=

∗rat ∧ rat and ψ := Ox), to obtain:
(∗rat ∧ rat)→ νx.Ox,
which is precisely the formula (6). ✷
The derivation of (6) has shown which proof-theoretic principles are suf-
ficient to obtain Theorem 1(i). It is interesting to note that no axioms or
rules for the modalities  and O were needed in order to derive (6). This
corresponds to the fact that in the proof of the corresponding inclusion in
Theorem 1(i) we did not use the fact that the possibility correspondences
were belief correspondences.
Corollary 1. The formula (6) is valid. ✷
In the language Lν , rat1, . . ., ratn are propositional constants. We can
define them in terms of the i and Oi modalities but to this end we need to
extend the language Lν to a second-order one by allowing quantifiers over set
variables, so by allowing formulae of the form ∃Xφ. It is clear how to extend
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the semantics to this larger class of formulae. In the resulting language each
rati constant is definable by a formula of the latter language:
rati ≡ ∀X(iX → OiX), (7)
where ∀Xφ is an abbreviation for ¬∃X¬φ.
The following observation then shows correctness of this definition.
Note 5. For all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} the formula (7) is valid. ✷
Let us mention that such second-order extensions of propositional modal
logics were first considered in Fine [1970].
To further our syntactic analysis, we now give a language LO which can be
used to define and analyze the optimality properties φi(·, ·). It is a first-order
language formed from a family of n ternary relation symbols x ≥iz y, where
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, along with the binary relation x ∈ X between a first-order
variable and a set variable. LO is given by the following recursive definition:
φ ::= x ∈ X | x ≥iz y | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | ∃xφ,
where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
We use the same abbreviations → and ∨ as above and further abbreviate
¬y ≥iz x to x >
i
z y, ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ φ) to ∃x ∈ Xφ, ∀x(x ∈ X → φ) to ∀x ∈ Xφ,
and write ∀xφ for ¬∃x¬φ.
By an optimality condition for player i we now mean a formula con-
taining exactly one free first-order variable and the set variable X , and in
which all the occurrences of the atomic formula x ≥jz y are with j equal to i.
In particular, we are interested in the following optimality conditions:
• sdli(x,X) := ∀y ∈ X∃z ∈ Xx ≥
i
z y,
• sdgi (x,X) := ∀y∃z ∈ Xx ≥
i
z y,
• wdli(x,X) := ∀y ∈ X(∀z ∈ Xx ≥
i
z y ∨ ∃z ∈ Xx >
i
z y),
• wdgi (x,X) := ∀y(∀z ∈ Xx ≥
i
z y ∨ ∃z ∈ Xx >
i
z y),
• brli(x,X) := ∃z ∈ X∀y ∈ Xx ≥
i
z y,
• brgi (x,X) := ∃z ∈ X∀y x ≥
i
z y.
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We now give a semantics for LO-formulae in the context of a model
(Ω, s1, . . . , sn) for the initial game H . An assignment is a function α that
maps each first-order variable to a state in Ω and each set variable to an
event in (a subset of) Ω. The semantics is given by a satisfaction relation
between an assignment α and a formula φ of LO, with |=α φ meaning that α
satisfies φ. This relation is defined as follows:
• |=α x ∈ X iff α(x) ∈ α(X),
• |=α x ≥
i
z y iff pi(si(α(x)), s−i(α(z))) ≥ pi(si(α(y)), s−i(α(z))),
• |=α ¬φ iff not |=α φ,
• |=α φ ∧ ψ iff |=α φ and |=α ψ,
• |=α ∃xφ iff there is an ω ∈ Ω such that |=α[x 7→ω] φ,
where:
α[x 7→ ω](x0) :=
{
α(x) if x 6= x0
ω otherwise.
This semantics allows us to relate the above six optimality conditions to
the corresponding optimality properties that are concerned solely with pure
strategies.
Note 6. For each optimality condition φi, where φ ∈ {sd
l, sdg, wdl, wdg, brl, brg}
|=α φi(x,X) iff the property φi(si(α(x)), Gα(X)) holds.
✷
To relate optimality conditions to monotonic optimality properties we
need one more definition. We say that a formula φ of LO is positive just
when every occurrence of the set variable X occurs under a positive number
of negation signs (¬). So for example the formula brli(x,X), that is, ∃z ∈
X∀y ∈ Xx ≥iz y, is not positive, since the second occurrence of X is under
one negation sign, while brgi (x,X), that is, ∃z ∈ X∀y x ≥
i
z y, is positive.
The following observation then links syntactic matters with monotonicity.
Note 7. For every positive optimality condition φi(x,X) for player i the
corresponding property φi(si, G) (used by player i) is monotonic. ✷
Among the above six optimality conditions only sdgi (x,X) and br
g
i (x,X)
are positive. The corresponding other four properties, as already mentioned
earlier, are not monotonic. By the above observation they cannot be defined
by positive formulae.
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7 Public announcements
The main result, Theorem 1(i), dealt with the outcome T∞
φ
of the iterated
elimination of strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal, and crucially
relied on the assumption that each property φi is monotonic. However, this
outcome exists for arbitrary φis. In this section we show that for a large class
of properties φi this outcome can be characterized by means of the concept
of a public announcement. This approach, inspired by van Benthem [2007],
applies to all global properties introduced in Section 3, some of which are
non-monotonic.
The particular kind of “public announcement” that we will be interested
in is a set of true statements, one by each player i to the effect that i will
not play any strategy that is not optimal for him, according to his notion of
optimality. Note that there is no strategic element to these announcements:
the players simply follow a protocol from which they cannot deviate. The
announcements are “public” in the sense that every other player hears them
as they happen.
The iterated public announcements can be thought of as a process in
which the players learn how the game will be played. The limit of this
learning process represents the situation in which the announcements lead
to no change in the model, at which point it can be said that rationality has
been learned by all players. It is in this sense that public announcements
provide alternative epistemic foundations for the outcome T∞
φ
.
Let us clarify first what we would like to achieve. Consider a model M
for the initial game H . The process of iterated elimination of the strategies
that are not φi-optimal, formalized by the iterated applications of the Tφ
operator, produces a sequence T α
φ
, where α is an ordinal, of restrictions of
H . We would like to mimic it on the side of the models, so that we get a
corresponding sequence Mα of models of these restrictions.
To make this idea work we need to define an appropriate way of reducing
models. We take care of it by letting the players repeatedly announce that
they only select φi-optimal strategies. This brings us to the notions of public
announcements and their effects on the models.
Given a model M = (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) we define
• a public announcement by player i in a model M as an event E in
M,
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• given a vector E := (E1, . . ., En) of public announcements by players
1, . . ., n we let
[E](M) := (∩ni=1Ei, (si |∩
n
i=1Ei)i∈{1,. . .,n})
and call it the effect of the public announcements of E on M.
Given a property φi(·, G) that player i uses to select his strategies in the
restriction G of H and a model M := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) for G we define [[φi]] as
the event in M that player i selects optimally his strategies with respect to
G. Formally:
[[φi]] := {ω ∈ Ω | φi(si(ω), G)}
(Note that in the notation of the previous section we have [[φ]] = I(OiT),
where T := ψ ∨ ¬ψ.) We abbreviate the vector ([[φ1]], . . ., [[φn]]) to [[φ]].
We want now to obtain the reduction of a model M of G to a model M
of Tφ(G) by means of the just defined vector [[φ]] of public announcements.
The effect of the public announcements of E on a model of G should
ideally be a model of the restriction GE . Unfortunately, this does not hold
in such generality. Indeed, let the two-player game G have the strategy
sets G1 := {U,D}, G2 := {L,R} and consider the model M for G with
Ω := {ωul, ωdr} and the functions s1 and s2 defined by
s1(ωul) = U, s2(ωul) = L, s1(ωdr) = D, s2(ωdr) = R.
This simple example is depicted in Figure 2.
L R
U ωul
D ωdr
Figure 2: A motivating example for the use of standard models
Let E = ({ωul}, {ωdr}); then [E](M) = ∅, which is not a model of GE =
({U}, {R}).
A remedy lies in restricting one’s attention to the standard models. How-
ever, in order to find a faithful public announcement analogue to strategy
elimination we must also narrow the concept of a public announcement as fol-
lows. A proper public announcement by player i in a standard model is
a subset of Ω = G1×. . .×Gn of the form G1×. . .×Gi−1×G
′
i×Gi+1×. . .×Gn.
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So a proper public announcement by a player is an event that amounts to
a ‘declaration’ by the player that he will limit his attention to a subset of his
strategies, that is, will discard the remaining strategies. So when each player
makes a proper public announcement, their combined effect on the standard
model is that the set of states (or equivalently, the set of joint strategies)
becomes appropriately restricted. An example, which is crucial for us, of a
proper public announcement in a standard model is of course [[φi]].
The following note links in the desired way two notions we introduced.
It states that the effect of the proper public announcements of E on the
standard model for G is the standard model for the restriction of G to E.
Note 8. Let M be the standard model for G and E a vector of proper public
announcements by players 1, . . ., n inM. Then [E](M) is the standard model
for GE.
Proof. We only need to check that ∩ni=1Ei is the set of joint strategies of
the restriction GE . But each Ei is a proper announcement, so it is of the
form G1 × . . . × Gi−1 × G
′
i × Gi+1 × . . . × Gn, where G = (G1, . . ., Gn). So
∩ni=1Ei = G
′
1 × . . .×G
′
n.
Moreover, each function si is a projection, so GE = (s1(E1), . . ., sn(En)) =
(G′1, . . ., G
′
n). ✷
We also have the following observation that links the vector [[φ]] of public
announcements with the operator Tφ of Section 3.
Note 9. Let M := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) be the standard model for G. Then
Tφ(G) = G[[φ]].
Proof. Let G = (G1, . . ., Gn), Tφ(G) = (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n) and G[[φ]] = (S
′′
1 , . . ., S
′′
n).
Fix i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Then we have the following string of equivalences:
si ∈ G
′
i
iff si ∈ Gi ∧ φi(si, G)
(si is onto) iff si ∈ Gi ∧ ∃ω ∈ Ω (si = si(ω) ∧ φi(si(ω), G))
iff si ∈ Gi ∧ ∃ω ∈ [[φi]] (si = si(ω))
iff si ∈ S
′′
i .
✷
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Denote now by [[φ]]
∞
the iterated effect of the public announcements of
[[φ]] starting with the standard model for the initial game H . The following
conclusion then relates the iterated elimination of the strategies that for
player i are not φi-optimal to the iterated effects of the corresponding public
announcements.
Corollary 2. [[φ]]
∞
is the standard model for the restriction T∞
φ
.
Proof. By Notes 8 and 9. ✷
Note that in the above corollary each effect of the public announcements
of [[φ]] is considered on a different standard model. Note also that the above
result holds for arbitrary properties φi, not necessarily monotonic ones.
We already mentioned in Section 1 that for various natural properties
φ transfinite iterations of Tφ may be needed to reach the outcome T
∞
φ
. So
the same holds for the iterated effects of the corresponding public announce-
ments. It is useful to point out that, as shown in Parikh [1992] a similar
situation can arise in case of natural dialogues the aim of which is to reach
common knowledge.
This analysis gives an account of public announcements of the optimality
of players’ strategies. We now extend this analysis to public announcements
of rationality. To this end we additionally assume for each player a belief
correspondence Pi : Ω→ P(Ω), that is we consider belief models.
We define then the event of player i being φi-rational in the restriction G
as
〈φi〉 := {ω ∈ Ω | φi(si(ω), GPi(ω))}.
(Note that in the notation of the previous section we have 〈φi〉 = I(rati).)
Again we abbreviate (〈φ1〉, . . . , 〈φn〉) to 〈φ〉. Note that 〈φ〉 depends on the
underlying belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn) and on G.
We extend the definition of the effect of the public announcements E :=
(E1, . . ., En) to belief models in the natural way, by restricting each possibility
correspondence to the intersection of the events in E:
[E](M, P1, . . ., Pn) = ([E]M, P1 |∩
n
i=1Ei, . . ., Pn |∩
n
i=1Ei).
This definition is in the same spirit as in Plaza [1989] and in Osborne and
Rubinstein [1994, page 72], where it is used in the analysis of the puzzle of
the hats.
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We aim to find a class of belief models for which, under a mild restriction
on the properties φi, 〈φ〉
∞, the iterated effect of the public announcements
of 〈φ〉 starting with the standard belief model for the initial game H , will be
the standard belief model for T∞
φ
. We will therefore use a natural choice of
possibility correspondences, which we call the standard possibility cor-
respondences :
Pi(ω) = {ω
′ ∈ Ω | si(ω) = si(ω
′)}.
By the standard knowledge model for a restriction G we now mean the
standard model forG endowed with the standard possibility correspondences.
The following observation holds.
Note 10. Consider the standard knowledge model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn)
for a restriction G := (G1, . . ., Gn) of H and a state ω ∈ Ω. Then
GPi(ω) = (G1, . . ., Gi−1, {ωi}, Gi+1, . . ., Gn).
Proof. Immediate by the fact that in the standard knowledge model for each
possibility correspondence we have Pi(ω) = {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′i = ωi}. ✷
Intuitively, this observation states that in each state of a standard knowl-
edge model each player knows his own choice of strategy but knows nothing
about the strategies of the other players. So standard possibility correspon-
dences represent the beliefs of each player after he has privately selected his
strategy but no information between the players has been exchanged. It
is in that sense that the standard knowledge models are natural. In van
Benthem [2007] in effect only such models are considered.
A large class of properties φi satisfy the following restriction:
A For all G := (G1, . . . , Gn) and G
′ := (G′1, . . . , G
′
n) such that Gj = G
′
j for
all j 6= i,
φi(si, G) ↔ φi(si, G
′).
That restriction on the properties φi is sufficient to obtain the following
analogue of Corollary 2 for the case of public announcements of rationality.
Theorem 6. Suppose that each property φ1, . . ., φn satisfies A. Then 〈φ〉
∞
is the standard knowledge model for the restriction T∞
φ
.
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Proof. Notice that it suffices to prove for each restriction G the following
statement for each i:
∀ω ∈ Ω φi(ωi, G) ↔ φi(ωi, GPi(ω)). (8)
Indeed, (8) entails that 〈φi〉 = [[φi]], in which case the result follows from
Corollary 2 and the observation that the possibility correspondences are re-
stricted in the appropriate way.
But (8) is a direct consequence of the assumption of A and of Note 10.
✷
To see the consequences of the above result note that A holds for each
global property sd gi , msd
g
i , wd
g
i , mwd
g
i and (all three forms of) br
g
i intro-
duced in Section 3.
For each φi equal sd
g
i and finite games Theorem 6 boils down to Theorem
7 in van Benthem [2007]. The corresponding result for each φi equal to br
g
i ,
with the beliefs consisting of the joint strategies of the opponents, and finite
games is mentioned at the end of Section 5.4 of that paper.
It is interesting to recall that the properties wd gi and mwd
g
i , in contrast
to sd gi and msd
g
i and br
g
i , are not monotonic. So, in contrast to Theorem 1,
we have now a characterization of T∞
φ
for both forms of weak dominance.
Also it is important to note that the above Corollary does not hold for
the corresponding local properties sd li , msd
l
i , wd
l
i , mwd
l
i and br
l
i introduced
in Section 3. Indeed, for each such property φi by Note 10 φi(ωi, GPi(ω))
holds for each state ω and restriction G. Consequently 〈φ〉 = Ω. So when
each φi is a local property listed above, 〈φ〉 is an identity operator on the
standard knowledge models, that is 〈φ〉∞ is the standard knowledge model
for the initial game H and not T∞
φ
.
Still, as the following result shows, it is possible for finite games to draw
conclusions about the outcome of the iterated elimination of strategies that
are not optimal in a local sense.
Theorem 7. Assume the initial game H is finite. Then for each φ ∈
{sd,msd, wd,mwd, br}, 〈φg〉∞ is the standard knowledge model for the re-
striction T∞
φl
.
Proof. We rely on the following results that for finite games link the out-
comes of the iterations of the corresponding local and global properties:
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• (see Apt [2007b])
T∞
br l
= T∞br g ,
• (see Apt [2007c])
T∞
φl
= T∞φg for φ ∈ {sd, wd},
• (see Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006])
T∞
msdl
= T∞msdg ,
• (see Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2008])
T∞
mwdl
= T∞mwdg .
The conclusion now follows by Theorem 6. ✷
This corollary states that for finite games the outcome of, for example
the customary iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, T∞
wdl
, can
be obtained by iterating on the standard knowledge models the effect of the
public announcements by all players of the corresponding global version of
weak dominance, wd gi . So, yet again, we see an intimate interplay between
the local and global notions of dominance.
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